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THE NEW "PICK-YOUR-OWN" STATUTES:
DELINEATING LIMITED IMMUNITY
FROM TORT LIABILITY
Terence J. Centner*
Over the past several years, state legislatures have been asked to
provide immunity from liability for members of certain interest
groups including providers of horses, risky sport activities, and
"pick-your-own" produce. This Article reports on statutory provi-
sions providing tort immunity for producers who allow the public
to come onto their property to harvest crops. Provisions allowing
profit-making businesses to qualify for tort immunity are not new,
but the expansion to cover pick-your-own operators signifies a sig-
nificant policy change regarding personal liability. The pick-your-
own provisions may indicate a policy shift imposing greater
responsibility for persons engaging in activities to use care in
avoiding injuries and less responsibility for qualifying service
providers. As legislatures contemplate new immunity provisions,
Professor Centner advises that these new provisions should be
harmonized with existing standards and liability exceptions. When
compared to the sport activity statutes, he concludes that the new
pick-your-own statutes fail to provide sufficient protection for pick-
your-own operations.
INTRODUCTION
Past successes at the state level in securing legislative
protection for agricultural objectives1 have led agricultural
* Professor, College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, The Univer-
sity of Georgia, Athens. B.S. 1973, Cornell University; J.D. 1976, S.U.N.Y. Buffalo
School of Law; LL.M. 1982, University of Arkansas School of Law.
1. Two examples of such legislation are right-to-farm laws and new provisions
regarding implied warranties of animal health. A number of states have enacted
right-to-farm laws to protect agricultural producers against nuisance actions. See
Margaret R. Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory
Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 163-65
(delineating a model right-to-farm statute); Neil D. Hamilton & David Bolte,
Nuisance Law and Livestock Production in the United States: A Fifty-State Analysis,
10 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 99, 101 (1988) (noting that 49 states had adopted right-to-
farm statutes); Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-to-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in
the Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. PiTT. L. REV. 289, 350 (1984) (concluding that
right-to-farm statutes reverse the preference for development under traditional
nuisance law to favor the less intensive use of land).
As for livestock warranties, Nebraska began a trend in 1976 with the enactment
of a disclaimer of liability for implied warranties of animal health. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 91-2-316(3)(d) (1992). Nearly one-half of the states adopted similar amend-
ments in the subsequent decade. See, e.g., Terence J. Centner & Michael E.
Wetzstein, Reducing Moral Hazard Associated with Implied Warranties of Animal
Health, 69 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 143, 143 (1987) (noting that 25 states had charted
modified warranty laws); D. L. Uchtmann et al., Do Statutory Exclusions of Implied
Warranties in Livestock Sales Immunize Sellers from Liability?, 8 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 21, 22-23 (1983) (noting that 21 states had enacted new statutory provisions).
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interest groups to expand their efforts on a number of fronts.2
While selected land use,3 anti-nuisance,4 financial,5 business,'
2. For example, in the six years following the enactment of a new equine
liability law by Washington, see 1989 WASH. LAWS 292, §§ 1, 2, over 30 states enacted
equine liability statutes. For a list of the states, see Terence J. Centner, The New
Equine Liability Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REV. 997, 1000 n.23 (1995).
3. See eg., ROBERT E. COUGHIN & JOHN C. KEENE, THE PROTECTION OF FARMLAND:
A REFERENCE GUIDEBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1981) (providing a
reference guide to programs aimed at protecting farmland); NEIL D. HAMILTON, A
LIVESTOCK PRODUCER' LEGAL GUIDE TO: NUISANCE, LAND USE CONTROL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (1992) (analyzing land use issues with respect to livestock production); Myrl L.
Duncan, Agriculture as a Resource: Statewide Land Use Programs for the Preservation
of Farmland, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401,478-83 (1987) (discussing potential problems with
state land use programs for preserving agricultural lands); Julian Conrad
Juergensmeyer, Farmland Preservation: A VitalAgricultural Law Issue for the 1980's,
21 WASHBURN L.J. 443, 476-77 (1982) (evaluating agricultural land preservation
programs to disclose ineffective coordination and implementation); Anne E. Mudge,
Impact Fees for Conversion of Agricultural Land: A Resource-Based Development
Policy for California's Cities and Counties, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 96 (1992) (suggesting
that states should implement fee programs to allow conversion of some farmland
while providing long term protection of other prime farmland).
4. See supra note 1 (describing the development of right-to-farm laws); see also
Randall Wayne Hanna, "Right to Farm" Statutes-The Newest Tool in Agricultural
Land Preservation, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 439 (1982) (arguing that states should
implement right-to-farm statutes in conjunction with farmland preservation pro-
grams); Mark B. Lapping et al., Right-to-Farm Laws: Do they Resolve Land Use
Conflicts?, 26 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERV. 465, 467 (1983) (finding an educational value
in right-to-farm laws).
5. See, e.g., Christopher R. Kelley & Alan R. Malasky, Federal Farm Program
Payment-Limitations Law: A Lawyer's Guide, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 199, 334-38
(1991) (analyzing payment limitations under federal farm programs); Drew L.
Kershen & J. Thomas Hardin, Congress Takes Exception to the Farm Products
Exception of the UCC: Centralized and Presale Notification Systems, 36 U. KAN. L.
REV. 383, 522-28 (1988) (evaluating federal filing provisions for farm products and
the problems ofretroactivity and preemption); Drew L. Kershen & J. Thomas Hardin,
Congress Takes Exception to the Farm Products Exception of the UCC: Retroactivity
and Preemption, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 78-79 (1988) (analyzing issues accompanying
the adoption of federal financing provisions concerning security interests in farm
products); Keith G. Meyer, Agricultural Credit and the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Need for Change?, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 469, 503 (1985) (opposing federal legislation
concerning the sale of farm products and advocating a central filing system); Steven
C. Turner et al., Agricultural Liens and the U.C.C.: A Report on Present Status and
Proposals for Change, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 9, 57 (1991) (surveying state lien laws as a
foundation for developing federal agricultural finance provisions); Edward A. Morse,
Note, Mediation in Debtor/Creditor Relationships, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 587, 614
(1987) (evaluating mediation as a method to address financial problems and as an
alternative to repossessing collateral).
6. See, e.g., Terence J. Centner, The New "Tractor Lemon Laws". An Attempt to
Squeeze Manufacturers Draws Sour Benefits, 14 J. PROD. LIAB. 121, 136 (1992)
(finding that new tractor lemon laws are not consumer friendly); Neil D. Hamilton,
Tending the Seeds: The Emergence of a New Agriculture in the United States, 1 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 7, 27 (1996) (considering challenges for a new agriculture); Roger A.
McEowen, Planning for the Tax Effects of Liquidating and Reorganizing the Farm
and Ranch Corporation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 467, 506 (1992) (analyzing the effects
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and bankruptcy 7 provisions for the agricultural sector have
garnered considerable attention,8 another important develop-
ing area involves statutory exceptions to reduce tort liability
in situations involving potential negligence. Because of the
investment and risk that accompany various agricultural
activities, states have passed laws to allow parties engaged in
agricultural enterprises to avoid liability for qualifying con-
duct or situations. 9
One of the reasons for the advancement of new liability
exceptions for parties engaged in agriculture is the level of
risk inherent in this sector of the economy.' ° Agriculture tends
to be one of the more dangerous occupations. 1 In 1994,
reported safety data regarding occupational death rates and
disabling injuries showed twenty-six deaths per 100,000
agricultural workers, one fewer than mining and quarrying,
the most dangerous occupation. 2 More than one-third of the
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on farm planning); Donald B. Pederson, Agricultural
Labor Law in the 1980s, 38 ALA. L. REV. 663, 698 (1987) (analyzing the issues in
providing benefits for agricultural laborers); Brian F. Stayton, A Legislative Experi-
ment in Rural Culture: The Anti-Corporate Farming Statutes, 59 UMKC L. REV. 679,
693 (1991) (raising the question of whether anti-corporate farming statutes help
preserve family farms or impede efficient production).
7. See, e.g., Jerry L. Jensen, Obtaining Operating Capital in a Chapter 12 Farm
Reorganization, 54 Mo. L. REV. 75, 119 (1989) (delineating provisions of Chapter 12
as they apply to family farmers); Christopher R. Kelley & Susan A. Schneider,
Selected Issues of Federal Farm Program Payments in Bankruptcy, 14 J. AGRIC. TAX'N
& L. 99, 100-05 (1992) (describing federal farm program payments as they relate to
the bankruptcy estate); David Ray Papke, Rhetoric and Retrenchment: Agrarian
Ideology and American Bankruptcy Law, 54 Mo. L. REV. 871, 897-98 (1989) (analyz-
ing ideological beliefs regarding farmer-related bankruptcies and Chapter 12's
nervous protection of a vanishing breed); Susan A. Schneider, Recent Developments
in Chapter 12 Bankruptcy, 24 IND. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1991) (arguing that Chapter
12 continues to be an important protection for farmers).
8. Two bibliographies provide a helpful summary of scholarly materials
currently available regarding agricultural law. See Salley J. Kelley et al., Agricul-
tural Law:A Selected Bibliography, 1985-1992, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 481 (1993);
Mary G. Persyn & Tim J. Watts, Selected Bibliography on Agricultural Law:
1980-1985, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 703 (1986).
9. For instance, in providing statutory protection to persons involved in equine
activities, the Illinois General Assembly found that the state and its citizens "derive
numerous economic and personal benefits from equine activities." 745 ILL. COMP. STAT.
47/5 (West Supp. 1996). The statute states that "it is the intent of the General
Assembly to encourage equine activities by delineating the responsibilities of those
involved in equine activities." Id.
10. A Colorado statute providing immunity for qualifying animal owners notes
the risks involved in equine and llama activities. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119
(Supp. 1996).
11. Agriculture has been defined to include the "production of crops and livestock
(farming) [and] agricultural services, forestry, and fishing." NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL,
ACCIDENT FACTS 136 (1995). The inclusion of forestry excludes logging. See id.
12. See id. at 48. Similar rates were found in 1992 and 1993. See id. at 50. Thus,
it is generally agreed that farming ranks as one of the most dangerous occupations
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non-fatal occupational injuries to agricultural workers come
from contact with objects and equipment. 13 Farm machinery
often involves parts and applications that are especially
dangerous to users, with tractor overturns alone accounting
for more than half of the reported on-the-farm fatalities.
14
Other problems include dangerous exposure to sunlight 5 and
various health problems caused by agricultural pesticides and
chemicals. 6
Agricultural services also reported significant non-fatal
occupational injuries and illnesses, v although the reported
number of missed days for agricultural workers is below the
average for all industries.' 8 In sum, there is a significant risk
of injury due to the dangers involved in agricultural occupa-
tions.
Moreover, changes in tort liability,' s including shifts from
comparative to contributory negligence 20 as well as advances
in the country. See David S. Pratt, Occupational Health and the Rural Worker:
Agriculture, Mining and Logging, 6 J. RURAL HEALTH 399 (1990); see also Judy Hayes
Bernhardt & Ricky L Langley, Accidental Occupational Farm Fatalities in North
Carolina: 1984-1988, 8 J. RURAL HEALTH 60 (1992) (examining unintentional work-
related farm fatalities in that jurisdiction).
13. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 53; see also John J. May,
Issues in Agricultural Health and Safety, 18 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 121, 122 (1990)
(estimating that 40 to 60 percent of agricultural injuries relate to the use of ma-
chinery).
14. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 137 (reporting figures for 1994,
with a summary of farm death information for 11 prior years).
15. For farmers, the skin is the organ system most commonly at risk. See May,
supra note 13, at 127. Of the major occupational categories, agriculture has the
highest rate of occupational skin disease. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 11,
at 72.
16. It is recognized that pesticide and chemical exposure cause injuries, but a
systematic summarization of the related injuries is difficult. Rather, chemical and
pesticide exposure is often simply listed as a problem. See Lynn Engberg, Women and
Agricultural Work, 8 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 869, 872-73 (1993) (summarizing health
risks from types of pesticides); Pratt, supra note 12, at 401-04 (summarizing acute
and chronic effects of pesticides on humans).
17. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 65 (delineating cases both
with and without lost workdays).
18. See id. at 69 (showing that agriculture and forestry workers experienced
below average rates for days away from work). This may be because fewer protections
are afforded rural workers as compared to urban workers. See Pratt, supra note 12,
at 399.
19. See William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascen-
dancy of Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 732 (arguing in favor of the
exclusion of tort liability from business disputes because of the use of tort law to
undermine allocations of risk); George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort
Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1991, at
31 (reviewing the development and expansion of tort law).
20. Under a contributory negligence standard, the negligence of a plaintiff often
defeated liability. Under a comparative negligence standard, both potential victims
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in the use of scientific evidence in the identification of pollut-
ers,2' have encouraged lawsuits against agricultural producers
and others in the agricultural sector.22 Given the current state
of technology and competition, the pastoral perceptions of the
once bucolic occupation are outdated. Although amber waves
of grain may grace the American landscape, the beauty of the
pastoral countryside does not diminish the danger of agricul-
tural activities.
Legislative bodies have employed three distinguishable
methods to help parties avoid liability for injuries and prop-
erty damages. The first method is to provide that certain
individuals are not liable for damages unless established
criteria are met. Good Samaritan statutes are the classic
example of immunity statutes that incorporate this method.24
and tortfeasors have moderate incentives to use caution in avoiding accidents, while
other standards entail relatively weak incentives for one party and strong incentives
for the other See Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for
Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1986) (noting changes from
1900, when all states had a defense of contributory negligence, to 1986, when only
six states had not switched to comparative negligence); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., The
Economics of Comparative Negligence, 7 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 149, 160 (1987)
(concluding that comparative negligence leads to a more efficient level of care).
21. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENViRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 182-204 (1992) (describing through case excerpts how plaintiffs may use
scientific information to establish a case, with the focus on proof of causation).
22. Large damage awards have also led to increases in insurance rates, thereby
causing problems for some firms in securing insurance coverage. See Robert G.
Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The Availabili-
ty/Affordability Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 285, 286 (1988)
(discussing the problems of higher insurance costs).
23. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-1.1 (West Supp. 1997) ("A municipal,
county or State law enforcement officer is not liable for any civil damages as a result
of any acts or omissions undertaken in good faith in rendering care at the scene of
an accident or emergency to any victim thereof, or in transporting any such victim
to a hospital or other facility where treatment or care is to be rendered; provided,
however, that nothing in this section shall exonerate a law enforcement officer for
gross negligence."). As this statutory provision demonstrates, immunity statutes often
limit the immunity by defining conduct that is not excused-in this case, gross
negligence.
24. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2398 (West 1990) (licensees providing emergency
medical assistance to participants of athletic events); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-374 (1982)
(persons assisting a human who is choking); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8 (1996) (licens-
ees providing ambulance service); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-131 (1992) (participants in
911 emergency service); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-30.1 (Supp. 1996) (drivers of fire
apparatus); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-30.2 (Supp. 1996) (drug abuse instructors); GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-1-30.3 (Supp. 1996) (persons donating services to schools); 225 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/31 (West Supp. 1997) (persons providing services at free medical
clinics); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-5-1.1-31 (West 1983) (veterinarians); N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 205-b (McKinney Supp. 1997) (volunteer firefighters); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.233 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (assistance under reciprocal fire protection
agreements); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4765.49 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996) (emergency
SUMMER 19971 747
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The second method is to alter the duty owed to selected per-
sons, thereby narrowing the circumstances in which remedies
are available if injury occurs.25 Recreational use statutes are
a classic example of this method.26 The third method is exem-
plified by legislative provisions that enumerate the responsi-
bilities of participants in sporting activities.27 Under sport
activity statutes, participants have certain duties28 and may
not collect damages for injuries which arise from the inherent
dangers of the sport.29
This Article examines a new category of statutory provisions
that states have introduced to lessen the liability of parties
who allow the public to come onto their property to harvest
produce. For convenience, the Article refers to these as "pick-
your-own" statutes.3 ° Although Good Samaritan statutes for
gleaning3 have existed for many years, 32 the pick-your-own
statutes expand immunity coverage beyond charitable activi-
ties to include profit-making business activities as well.33 The
pick-your-own statutes may be a part of a growing number of
statutory provisions enacted to reduce liability of persons
involved in business activities in a, manner previously
medical personnel and agencies); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.37 (West Supp. 1996) (persons
on health care oversight committees).
25. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.346 (West 1988) ([An owner of land owes no
duty of care to any person who enters on the land without charge . . ").
26. See John C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier Liability for Personal Injuries
and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective Is the Protection?, 24 IND. L. REV. 1587
(1991) (describing recreational use statutes generally); Stuart J. Ford, Comment,
Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: Towards Sharpening the Picture at the Edges,
Wis. L. REV. 491 (1991) (describing the Wisconsin recreational use statute and
discussing such statutes generally).
27. See infra notes 47-56.
28. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 18-105 (McKinney 1989) ("All skiers have
the following duties: 1. Not to ski in any area not designated for skiing; 2. Not to ski
beyond their limits or ability to overcome variations in slope, trail configuration and
surface or, subsurface conditions ... ; 3. To abide by the directions of the ski area
operator . . ").
29. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-112 (1995 & Supp. 1996) ("Notwithstanding
any judicial decision or any other law or statute to the contrary .... no skier may
make any claim against or recover from any ski area operator for injury resulting
from any of the inherent dangers and risks of skiing.").
30. See infra note 63 for a comprehensive list of pick-your-own statutes.
31. "Gleaning" is the gathering of grain after reapers, or of grain left ungathered
by reapers. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 690 (6th ed. 1990).
32. See infra note 37 for a comprehensive list of gleaning statutes.
33. See, e.g.,MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1997) ("A cause
of action shall not arise . . . for injuries to a person . . . who is on the land or
premises for the purpose of picking and purchasing agricultural or farm products
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available only for persons involved in governmental or
charitable activities.34
In order to situate pick-your-own statutes within the exist-
ing legal structure of liability immunity provisions, Part I
identifies several other areas of statutory law that provide
immunity against tort liability in certain situations. Part II
discusses several aspects of the pick-your-own statutory
provisions and divides them into two categories according to
the structures through which they convey statutory immunity.
One approach combines an unreasonable risk standard with
affirmative duties; the second employs an egregious miscon-
duct standard that provides immunity unless conduct is
willful, wanton, or reckless.
Part III examines several cases involving injuries to persons
picking produce. Part IV builds on this analysis by evaluating
the justifications offered for legislative efforts to limit liability
and explores the likely effects of the two statutory schemes on
the results in the cases. Finally, the Article identifies four
specific issues for legislatures to consider when enacting these
types of provisions (qualifications on a defendant's status,
premises covered, actions precluded, and conduct excused) and
suggests some guidelines for their application.
I. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY
States have enacted Good Samaritan and recreational use
statutes to provide immunity from tort liability in various
circumstances.35 Four categories of statutes that provide
legislative exceptions from common law liability for parties
involved in enumerated activities are particularly useful for an
analysis of pick-your-own provisions.
34. See infra notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
35. For an analysis of Good Samaritan statutes and the difficulties they create,
see Frank B. Mapel, III & Charles J. Weigel, II, Good Samaritan Laws-Who Needs
Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protection in the United States, 21 S.
TEX. LAW J. 327 (1981); see also Eric A. Brandt, Comment, Good Samaritan
Laws-The Legal Placebo:A CurrentAnalysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303 (1983) (updating
the Mapel & Weigel analysis). See generally Robert A. Mason, Comment, Good
Samaritan Laws-Legal Disarray: An Update, 38 MERCER L. REV. 1439 (1987)
(analyzing Good Samaritan statutes and case law). For recent literature concerning
recreational use statutes, see supra note 26.
SUMMER 1997]
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The first category of statutes consists of "gleaning statutes,"
which provide immunity for the charitable act of allowing
needy individuals to collect crops remaining after a harvest.36
Sixteen states have adopted gleaning statutes.3 7 While glean-
ing historically involved the harvesting of "farm products from
the fields of a farmer who grants access to the fields without
,38charging a fee," in some states the term also includes dona-
tion and distribution activities. 9
The second category of immunity provisions consists of
veterinary Good Samaritan Statutes. These statutes provide
some degree of immunity to veterinarians treating animals in
certain circumstances. 40 To qualify under a veterinary Good
Samaritan statute, a veterinarian generally must be treating
an animal in an emergency. 4' Several of the statutes require
36. Blackstone notes that the poor may have a right "by the common law and
custom of England" to enter another's land after harvest to glean a crop without
being guilty of trespass. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *212.
37. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107(a) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 846.2 (West Supp 1997); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1301 to -1302 (1990 & Supp. 1996); IND.
CODE. ANN. §§ 34-4-12.9-1 to -3 (West Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2799,
9:2800.4 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West Supp.
1996); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-308.1 (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.73301(3) (West Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.491 (1996); N.Y. AGRIC. &
MKTS. LAW §§ 71-y to -z (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-706
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.35 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8338 (West Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-102 to -103 (1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 4-34-5 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.80.031 (West Supp. 1997). Tennessee
does not use the terms glean or gleaning but rather pick and picking. See TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 70-7-102 to -103 (1995). Because no consideration is permitted for the
Tennessee provisions, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-7-104 (1995), it is more analogous to
a gleaning statute than a pick-your-own statute. Nevada lists gleaning in its
recreational use statute. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.510(4)(j) (1995).
38. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-308.1(a)(6)(i) (1995).
39. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2799.3 (West 1991) (donation of food); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 41.491(1) (1995) (donation of food and grocery products); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS.
LAW § 71-z (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1997) (donation of canned or perishable food).
40. See ALA. CODE § 34-29-90 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (Michie 1996); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4826.1 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-64-118 (1991); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 768.13(3) (Harrison 1994); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/18 (West 1995); IND. STAT.
ANN. § 15-5-1.1-31 (West 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-841 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1731(c) (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2-314 (Supp. 1996); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 58A (1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 346.37, subd. 2 (West 1990);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:16-9.11 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 698.17 (West
1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8331.1 (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-15-15
(1987); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8891 (West Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-3811 (Michie 1994).
41. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 58A (1996); see also Terence J. Centner,
Legal Rights of Veterinarians under Veterinary Good Samaritan Statutes and Equine
Liability Statutes, 210 J. AM. VET. MED. ASS'N, 190,191 (1997). But see VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-3811 (Michie 1994) (stating that no emergency is required).
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that there be no fee for the veterinary service," and others
specify that veterinarians are not immune if their conduct is
grossly negligent.43
The third category of statutes, groundwater liability
statutes, reduces the liability of agricultural producers for
groundwater contamination." These statutes preclude liability
of agricultural producers who apply registered pesticides
according to label instructions and regulations. These statutes,
which do not apply to personal injury claims,45 alter strict
liability standards by providing that producers are liable only
if they are negligent.4"
Finally, the relative frequency of injuries that result from
risky sport activities gave rise to the fourth category. This
category consists of statutes that attempt to limit the liability
of persons providing or involved in the provision of an
enumerated sport activity. Activities that have received
special statutory protection include horseback riding,4 7
42. See ALA. CODE § 34-29-90 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-64-118 (1996); FLA.
STAT. ANN. ch. 768.13(3) (Harrison 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-841(a) (1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1731 (West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 58A (1996).
43. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (Michie 1994); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4826.1
(West Supp. 1990); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/18 (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 15-5-1.1-31 (West 1983); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2-314 (Supp. 1996) (relying on the
standard set forth in MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-343 (1995); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8331.1 (West 1996); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8891 (West Supp.
1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3811 (Michie 1994).
44. See GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-170 (Michie 1990); IDAHO CODE § 39-127 (1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 455E.6 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 18D.101 (West Supp. 1997); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1410(d) (Supp. 1996); see also Terence J. Centner, Groundwater
Quality Regulation: Implications for Agricultural Operations, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 589,
597-99 (1989) (outlining liability standards regarding agricultural pesticide contami-
nation).
45. See GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-170 (Michie 1990) (covering "damages, response
costs, or injunctive relief relating to any direct or indirect discharge or release into,
or actual or threatened pollution of, the land, waters, air, or other resources of the
state"); IDAHO CODE § 39-127 (1993) (covering groundwater contamination); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 455E.6 (West 1997) (covering costs of active cleanup and damages associated
with nitrates); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 18D.101 (West Supp. 1997) (covering the cost of
active cleanup and damages associated with agricultural chemicals in groundwater);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1410(d) (Supp. 1996) (covering the alteration of groundwater
quality or character).
46. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-170 (Michie 1990). For a case where a defen-
dant was liable under strict liability for groundwater contamination, see Branch v.
Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 274 (Utah 1982) (finding that an abnormally
dangerous ponding of toxic formation water supported strict liability).
47. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-337 (1993); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-553 (West Supp.
1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-120-201 to -202 (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-119 (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577p (West Supp.
1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8140 (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 773.01-.05
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skiing,48 roller skating,49 whitewater rafting,5" hockey,5' and
hiking.52 The objective of sport activity statutes is to place on
participants the burden of the harm from certain char-
acteristic injuries, the risks of which are inherent in the
particular sport.5 3 Many of these statutes define duties for
persons making property or activities available to the public,54
and others specify duties or responsibilities for participants.55
(Harrison 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-1 to -4 (Michie 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 663B-1 to -2 (Michie 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1801 to -1802 (1990); 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 47/1 to 47/999 (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-44-1 to -12 (West
Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-4001 to -4004 (1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2795.1 (West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 4101 to 4104-A (West
Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 128, § 2D (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 691.1661-. 1667 (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A. 12 (West Supp. 1997);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 95-11-1 to -7 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.325 (West Supp. 1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-725 to -728 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-13-1 to -5 (Michie
Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-10-01 to -02 (Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 30.687-.697 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 4-21-1 to -4 (Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-9-710 to -730 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 42-11-1 to -5
(Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-20-101 to -105 (1993); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 87.001-.005 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27b-101 to
-102 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.1-796.130-.133 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 4.24.530-.540 (1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-4-1 to -7 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie Supp. 1996); see also Act Effective March 3, 1997,
§ 2305.321, 1996 Ohio Legis. Bull. 2125 (Anderson).
48. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 05.45.010-.210 (Michie 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-
44-101 to -114 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-211 to -214 (1983);
IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to -1109 (1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 15217, 15218
(Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 143, §§ 71N-O (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 408.321-.344 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731 to -736
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:13-1 to -11 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to -14
(Michie 1994); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 18-101 to -108 (McKinney 1989 & Supp.
1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-09-01 to -11 (1989 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4169.01-.99 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.970-.990
(1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 41-8-1 to -4 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1992
& Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70-117.010-.040 (1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3A-1
to -8 (1996).
49. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 72/1 to 30 (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1721-.1726 (West Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:14-1 to -7 (West
1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-21-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
50. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to -5 (1996).
51. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 52/1 to 52/99 (West Supp. 1996).
52. See IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1201 to -1206 (1990) (dealing with outfitters and guides).
53. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:14-6 (West 1996) ("Roller skaters and spectators
are deemed to have knowledge of and to assume the inherent risks for roller skating,
insofar as those risks are obvious and necessary.").
54. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-107 to -108 (1995 & Supp. 1996) (ski area
operators); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1103 to -1104 (1990) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 408.326a (West 1985) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:14-4 (West 1996) (roller skating
rink operators).
55. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-735 to -736 (1996) (dealing with tramway
passengers and skiers).
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By establishing these duties, the statutes preclude the partici-
pants from recovering for injuries resulting from any of the
inherent dangers and risks of the sport.56
Although it is possible to distinguish the provisions of these
four categories of tort exceptions from those of the pick-your-
own statutes, there are also some important similarities. From
the gleaning statutes, the pick-your-own statutes adopt the
precept that immunity is available against persons entering
agricultural lands.57 Similarly, the two immunity strategies of
the pick-your-own statutes58 mirror those of veterinary Good
Samaritan statutes59 in that they maintain liability either for
gross negligence or for willful conduct.60 Although groundwater
contamination legislation has not been widely adopted, it
demonstrates that agricultural interest groups are able to
alter liability standards for agricultural producers.61 The sport
activity statutes indicate that possessors of property may not
be required to provide their services free of charge to qualify
for statutory immunity.62
56. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:14-7 (West 1996) ("The assumption of risk set
forth [in] this act shall be a complete bar of suit and shall serve as a complete defense
to a suit against an operator by a roller skater or spectator for injuries resulting from
the assumed risks .... ); Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp., 428 N.W.2d 742
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that all skiers assume the obvious and necessary
dangers of skiing).
57. Persons allowed to glean enter the possessor's land to secure agricultural
products free of charge. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.9-3 (West Supp. 1996).
Persons allowed to enter to pick their own produce may pay for the goods. See, e.g.,
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1996).
58. See infra notes 100-39 and accompanying text.
59. Actually, the veterinary Good Samaritan Statutes have three different stan-
dards concerning conduct that does not qualify under statutory immunity provisions.
Under some statutes, veterinarians are liable for certain negligent actions. See
Centner, supra note 41, at 194. Most statutes impose liability for gross negligence,
although a few seem to provide immunity for such conduct. See id.
60. The unreasonable risk strategy adopted by three pick-your-own statutes
means that a possessor may be liable for negligence if there was an unreasonable
risk, while under an egregious misconduct strategy a possessor may not be liable for
gross negligence.
61. The groundwater contamination legislation may place liability on innocent
victims. See Centner, supra note 44, at 603.
62. All of the sport activity statutes allow possessors to collect fees yet qualify
for statutory immunity. See infra notes 27-29 & 47-56.
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II. PICK-YOUR-OWN STATUTES
Five states have adopted pick-your-own statutes that con-
tain provisions addressing injuries to persons harvesting
agricultural produce for personal use.63 As with other statutes
providing some type of protection from liability, the pick-your-
own statutes attempt to limit liability in various situations.64
New Hampshire seems to have been the first state to adopt
this type of statute, with a stated purpose of "encourag[ing]
productive agriculture within the state."65 While the spread of
pick-your-own statutes has been slow, recent legislative action
signals an interest in enacting this type of statutory protec-
tion.66
As with many groups of similar state statutes, some major
distinctions exist among provisions enacted to achieve similar
objectives. Differences exist among the various state provisions
regarding defendant qualifications, precluded recovery actions,
and the scope of protected activities.67 The major difference
among the pick-your-own statutes, however, concerns the
structural means by which they confer immunity. The most
prevalent strategy grants immunity unless a condition creates
an unreasonable risk accompanied by enumerated prerequi-
sites.6' A second group of statutes provides an exception from
liability as long as the defendant did not engage in willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct.69
63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107(b), (c) (Michie Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 128, § 2E (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1996);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339 (West Supp.
1996). One might argue that Maine and Tennessee have pick-your-own statutes, but
the provisions do not apply to harvesting activities if there was consideration. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-102, -103
(1995). Thus, the Maine and Tennessee provisions are actually gleaning statutes
rather than pick-your-own statutes. See supra note 37.
64. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1996) ("A cause
of action shall not arise against the owner. . .
65. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997).
66. Recently introduced legislative bills include: H.B. 5524, Feb. 1996 Sess.
(Conn.); H.B. 1591, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996); A.B. 475, 207th Leg., 1st Sess.
(N.J. 1996); S.B. 1332, 207th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1996); S.B. 2056, 220th Sess. (N.Y.
1997); S.B. 301, 1996 Sess. (Vt.).
67. See infra Parts II.A-B.
68. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 18-60-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a) (West Supp.
1997); see also infra Part II.C.
69. See MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 128, § 2E (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14
(1997); see also infra Part II.D.
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A. Defendant Qualifications
One major difference among pick-your-own statutes concerns
qualifications for statutory protection. A description of the
potential defendants that qualify for statutory immunity,
various statutory preconditions, and the type of liability
thwarted by the statutes provides important parameters for
understanding the pick-your-own provisions.
The first qualification involves the relationship of the de-
fendant to the premises. While the original New Hampshire
statute limited qualification to the owners of land,7" many of
the current pick-your-own statutes cover other persons in-
cluding operators, 71 tenants,72 lessees,7 3 and employees..7 Given
the variety of leasing and business arrangements prevalent in
agricultural production, the New Hampshire limitation to
owners may fail to offer protection to individuals involved in
pick-your-own operations and may thereby limit the effective-
ness of the statutory immunity.
A second qualification for the protection afforded by the
pick-your-own statutes involves the type of land upon which
the accident occurred. The Massachusetts statute only applies
if the injury or damage occurred on a farm.75 Would a small
pick-your-own operator, such as a person allowing the public
to pick blueberries for some extra income, qualify as an owner
of a farm? The answer would depend on the definition of
"farm."7s The liability exception of the New Hampshire statute
is limited to an owner of land,77 raising a question whether
70. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997). Although the New Hampshire
statute was amended in 1985 to include occupants and lessees, the pick-your-own
provisions only apply to owners of land. See id.
71. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 128, § 2E (1996) (covering operators).
72. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1995); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 324.73301 (West Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339 (West Supp.
1996).
73. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 324.73301 (West Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339 (West Supp.
1996).
74. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 128, § 2E (1996).
75. See id. (limiting coverage to an "owner, operator, or employee of a" farm").
76. A part-time operator may not have a farm; the "business" may be a hobby.
Should a pick-your-own hobby qualify for statutory protection?
77. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997) (providing coverage to an owner of
"land").
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general tort law would apply to accidents in buildings or on
the shoulder of a road of a pick-your-own operation. By way of
contrast, other states' pick-your-own provisions offer immunity
from suit for injuries occurring on "land or premises" if the
statutory conditions are met.78
As cases applying the recreational use statutes demonstrate,
the type of land or water covered by the statute is also critical.
For example, in determining the coverage of the Arizona
recreational use statute,79 the Arizona Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether a roadway was within the
description of "premises" enumerated by the statute.8 0 The
plaintiff was injured while riding a bicycle on a roadway
owned by a private corporation operating water canals." The
defendant corporation claimed immunity under the recreation-
al use statute.8 2 After noting the statute's unusual description
of the type of land covered, 3 the court concluded that only
land used for a purpose enumerated in the statutory definition
of "premises" could qualify for immunity. 4 Since a roadway
was not within the statute's description of "premises," the
statutory immunity was unavailable to the defendant.8 5
Because statutory exceptions from liability such as these may
78. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a) (West Supp.
1997).
79. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551(A) (West 1990).
80. See Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 823 P.2d 1264, 1269-71 (Ariz. 1991). At the time of
the accident, the statute limited its grant of immunity to owners of "premises,'
defined as "agricultural, range, mining or forest lands, and any other similar lands
which by agreement are made available to a recreational user, and any building or
structure on such lands." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551(B)(1) (West 1990). The
statute was amended in 1993 to include parks and flood control lands as well as trails
and waterways on the lands. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551(C)(3) (West Supp.
1996).
81. See Bledsoe, 823 P.2d at 1266-67. The plaintiff was severely injured when
he rode into a cable strung across the roadway "to prevent access of unauthorized
motor vehicles." Id.
82. See id. at 1267. The defendant asserted that the roadway was necessary to
maintain the canals used to transport water for the irrigation of crops. Although the
land was not cultivated, it was used to support agricultural land; therefore argued
the defendant, it fell within the enumeration of agricultural lands. See id. at 1269.
83. See id. at 1268.
84. See id. at 1270. The court opined that application to all land capable of being
used for or supporting agricultural, mining, range, or forest uses would vitiate the
statute's land type limitation provision. See id.
85. See id. at 1270. The court also concluded that the roadway did not constitute
"other similar lands' as described by the statute. Id. at 1271.
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be narrowly construed, 6 it is likely that the qualifications of
the Massachusetts or New Hampshire provisions will fail to
provide meaningful immunity to agricultural operators for
some injuries.
B. Statutory Limitations on Actions
Some of the pick-your-own statutes restrict their liability
exception by allowing employees and contractors of the
defendant to maintain tort actions. The New Hampshire
statutory exemption does not apply to "an employee of the
landowner . ."87 Three pick-your-own statutes specifically
provide that they do not alter the rights of employees and
contractors.8 8 Therefore, injuries to an employee or contractor
by an owner, tenant, or lessee remain actionable under these
statutes.
The Massachusetts statute incorporates a warning require-
ment into the pick-your-own provisions.89 The owner or oper-
ator of a farm must post and maintain signs with a warning
notice.9" The statute sets forth requirements for the location,
size of print, and text of the warning.9 '
Pick-your-own statutes also differ significantly in terms of
the types of injury for which they preclude recovery. Whereas
all of the statutes provide immunity in cases of injuries to
86. See, e.g., id. at 1270 (concluding that the term "agricultural land" should be
narrowly construed in Arizona because it was intended to limit the statutory
protection); Tijerina v. Cornelius Christian Church, 539 P.2d 634, 637 (Or. 1975)
(concluding that the Oregon recreational use statute and the term "agricultural land"
should be interpreted narrowly in light of the legislative purpose). But see Ervin v.
City of Kenosha, 464 N.W.2d 654, 659 (Wis. 1991) (finding that the Wisconsin
recreational statute should be construed broadly to insulate persons from liability).
87. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14(11) (1997).
88. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 18-60-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a) (West Supp.
1996).
89. MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 128, § 2E (1996).
90. See id.
91. The signs must be visible to persons entering the pick-your-own operation,
and each letter on the sign is required to be at least one inch in height. See id. The
notice must specifically explain that "the owner, operator, or any employees of this
farm, shall not be liable for injury or death of persons, or damage to property,
resulting out of the conduct of this 'pick-your-own' harvesting activity in the absence
of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct." Id.
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persons engaged in pick-your-own activities, 92 only New Hamp-
shire and Massachusetts provide additional protection by
limiting liability for property damage. 93 Moreover, the Massa-
chusetts statute explicitly includes death within the scope of
its liability exception.94
Finally, the statutes impose differing limitations on the
activities qualifying for immunity. These differences are
significant because courts interpreting recreational use stat-
utes have held that if a statute enumerates the activities that
qualify for immunity, a plaintiffs actions must fall within the
enumerated activities to trigger the statute.95 All of the stat-
utes cover harvesting produce, and three statutes define
agricultural and farm products.96 The New Hampshire statute,
however, limits the statutory exception to gathering produce
of the land;97 it is uncertain whether the statute covers the
gathering of nursery or apiary products." Most of the statutes
do cover cut-your-own Christmas tree and firewood opera-
tions.99
92. See statutes cited supra note 63.
93. The Massachusetts statute relieves qualifying defendants from liability for
"injuries or death to persons, or damage to property, resulting from the conduct of
[the farm] in the absence of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
128, § 2E (1996). The New Hampshire statute says that an owner of land is not liable
for "property damage to any person." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997).
94. See MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 128, § 2E (1996).
95. See, e.g., Farnham v. Kittinger, 634 N.E.2d 162, 164 (N.Y. 1994) (analyzing
whether the use of a motorized vehicle fell within the statutory requirement of
.motorized vehicle operation for recreational purposes," N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 9-103
(McKinney 1989)). The New York Court of Appeals found that a person in a four-
wheel-drive vehicle that pulls offthe road for personal reasons does not automatically
trigger the recreational statute's immunity framework unless there is 'a showing of
particularized recreational use." Farnham, 634 N.E.2d at 166. This inquiry may
involve analyzing the subjective recreational intent of the plaintiff. See id.
96. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(6) (West Supp. 1996) ("As used in
this section, 'agricultural or farm products' means the natural products of the farm,
nursery, grove, orchard, vineyard, garden, and apiary, including, but not limited to,
trees and firewood."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107(c) (Michie Supp. 1995); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8339(b) (West Supp. 1997).
97. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1983) (including "pick-your-own or cut-
your-own arrangements").
98. See supra note 96.
99. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107(c) (Michie Supp. 1995) (covering trees
and firewood); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 128, § 2E (1996) (covering Christmas trees);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(6) (West Supp. 1996) (covering trees and
firewood); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997) (covering cut-your-own arrange-
ments); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(b) (West Supp. 1997) (covering trees and
firewood).
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C. Immunity Under an Unreasonable Risk Standard
The pick-your own statutes of several states provide that
persons are not liable for injuries unless the circumstances
explicitly set out in the statute are met and the injuries were
caused by a condition involving an unreasonable risk.' 0 The
states that enacted these statutes may be said to have adopted
an "unreasonable risk" standard. 10 1 The statutory prerequisites
for liability10 2 are taken from section 343 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.'0 3 A dangerous condition is not required,
only a condition that involves an unreasonable risk.' 4 More-
over, the Arkansas and Michigan statutes impose the addition-
al requirement that the plaintiff not know of the condition or
risk.105
Like section 343 of the Restatement, the pick-your-own
statutes hold possessors liable only under specifically defined
100. The Michigan statute, for example, provides as follows:
A cause of action shall not arise against the owner, tenant, or lessee of land
or premises for injuries to a person, other than an employee or contractor of the
owner, tenant, or lessee, who is on the land or premises for the purpose of
picking and purchasing agricultural or farm products at a farm or "u-pick"
operation, unless the person's injuries were caused by a condition that involved
an unreasonable risk of harm and all of the following apply:
(a) The owner, tenant, or lessee knew or had reason to know of the condition
or risk.
(b) The owner, tenant, or lessee failed to exercise reasonable care to make the
condition safe, or to warn the person of the condition or risk.
(c) The person injured did not know or did not have reason to know of the
condition or risk.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1996); accord ARK. CODE ANN. §
18-60-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a) (West Supp.
1997).
101. Liability for unreasonable risks has historically been premised on one of
three theories: "[Flailure to warn, negligent maintenance, or defective physical
structure." Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Mich. 1995) (analyzing
section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
102. See supra note 100 for the text of a statute incorporating section 343's
preconditions of liability into its unreasonable risk standard.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965) (subjecting a possessor of land to
liability for harm to his invitees only if the dangerous condition was known to or
discoverable by the possessor).
104. See infra note 114 (discussing a case decided under sections 343-43A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which involved an unreasonable risk, rather than a
dangerous condition).
105. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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circumstances. 10 6 Therefore, a defendant retains the statutory
immunity if any single prerequisite is not met, despite the
existence of a condition involving an unreasonable risk.1 7 A
plaintiff can maintain a cause of action only by alleging suffi-
cient facts to meet the statutory prerequisites.
After establishing the initial prerequisite of an unreasonable
risk, the plaintiff must substantiate two allegations: that the
defendant knew or had reason to know of the condition, and
that she failed to exercise reasonable care.'0 8 The defendant is
only liable if she knew or had reason to know of a condition or
risk that caused an injury.' 9 Evidence of constructive knowl-
edge of the condition or risk by a defendant would meet this
prerequisite. "'
The plaintiff must also show that the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care with respect to the condition or
risk."' If the defendant exercised reasonable care to make the
condition safe or to warn the plaintiff of the condition or risk,
the defendant continues to qualify for the statutory immuni-
ty." 2 Conversely, an allegation that the defendant failed to use
reasonable care, when combined with the other statutory
requirements, could present a fact question for the jury and
preclude summary judgment for a pick-your-own operator. 113
106. The rule concerning obvious dangers set forth in section 343A of the Restate-
ment may also apply. Physical harm resulting from a danger that is known or obvious
should not give rise to liability unless the possessor of land "should anticipate the
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A
(1965).
107. The Restatement's provisions addressing liability for unreasonable risks must
be read together with section 343A, which concerns known and obvious dangers. See
id. § 343 cmt. a. If an obvious danger causes injury to an invitee, the possessor may
not be liable. See id. § 343A.
108. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1997).
109. The condition of which the defendant knew or should have known must
involve an unreasonable risk of harm. See, e.g., supra note 100.
110. See Lawless v. Sasnett, 408 S.E.2d 432, 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (evaluating
an accident in a fruit orchard, finding that the evidence could establish constructive
knowledge of a condition, and reversing summary judgment for the orchard owners).
111. See MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 324.73301(5)(b) (West Supp. 1996) ("The owner,
tenant, or lessee failed to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to
warn the person of the condition or risk.'); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107(b)
(Michie Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a) (West Supp. 1997).
112. See supra note 111.
113. See, e.g., Lawless, 408 S.E.2d at 433 (finding that the orchard owners failed
to present evidence that they exercised reasonable care and concluding that a jury
could find the owners liable).
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Thus, under the pick-your-own statutes involving unreason-
able risks, plaintiffs may maintain negligence actions for some
conditions." 4
Some pick-your-own statutes require one additional prereq-
uisite to establish liability in cases where a condition involves
an unreasonable risk: that the plaintiff did not know or have
reason to know of the condition or risk that caused the
injury.115 A plaintiff who knew the risks involved, even if they
would normally be considered unreasonable, is estopped from
maintaining a lawsuit for injuries under these pick-your-own
statutes."16 This added prerequisite means that it may be more
difficult for a plaintiff to offer evidence of an unreasonable risk
that would present a jury question. 1 7
Perhaps the most important aspect of the unreasonable risk
pick-your-own statutes is that they establish an affirmative
duty beyond that which a possessor of land normally owes
licensees." 8 Under the common law of many states,"9 the
scope of the duty of care owed by possessors of property to
entrants is based on the entrant's legal status as an invitee,
licensee, or trespasser. 2 ° Possessors have a duty to maintain
114. The meaning of such a standard may be noted from a case involving a fall by
a 74-year-old plaintiff. See Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 185 (Mich. 1995)
(analyzing sections 343 & 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). The plaintiff
tripped over a step in defendant's service department, which was crowded with
vending machines, a cashier's window, and a door. See id. at 192. The court held that
although the risk of falling was obvious, whether the risk was unreasonable was a
question for the jury. See id.
115. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5)(c) (West Supp. 1996) ("The
person injured did not know or did not have reason to know of the condition or risk.").
The Restatement does not impose this requirement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 343, 343A (1965).
116. This follows from the policy that a person who knows of a danger should use
ordinary care to prevent injury from the known danger. See Bertrand, 537 N.W.2d at
187 (interpreting sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement to require that invitees
use ordinary care to avoid injury from obvious dangers, except in certain situations).
117. See, e.g., id. at 193 (finding a jury question in a case involving sections 343
and 343A).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 cmt. b (noting that the language of
section 343 imposes an additional duty to invitees).
119. A Missouri case reports that nineteen states and the District of Columbia
have abolished the licensee-invitee distinction. See Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926,
929-30 (Mo. 1995) (listing Alaska, California, Colorado (although reinstated), Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
and Wisconsin).
120. See Morin v. Bell Court Condo. Ass'n, 612 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Conn. 1992)
(finding that although licensees take the premises as found, there is an obligation to
exercise reasonable care for the protection of invitees); Weiseler v. Sisters of Mercy
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property in a reasonably safe condition for invitees, who are
invited to conduct business with the possessor. 121 Possessors
of property must make known dangers safe for licensees, who
enter for their own purposes, because possessors have a duty
to refrain from engaging in willful, wanton, or reckless con-
duct. 12
2
The pick-your-own statutes impose a duty on possessors to
exercise reasonable care in making premises safe or in warn-
ing invitees of conditions involving an unreasonable risk.123 If
evidence shows that the defendant had constructive knowledge
of a condition involving an unreasonable risk, a breach of
reasonable care to make the condition safe, or a duty to warn
the injured party of the condition, a plaintiff can establish a
cause of action for an injury that must be heard by the trier of
fact. "'24 Under these conditions, it would be possible for a
defendant who failed to exercise reasonable care to incur
liability despite the existence of a pick-your-own statute that
employs an unreasonable risk standard. 25
D. Immunity Except for Egregious Misconduct
Another group of state liability statutes immunizes
operators from liability for injuries to persons engaged in pick-
your-own activities unless the defendant engaged in willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct. 21 Under such provisions, a
Health Corp., 540 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 1995) (noting that invitees can expect land
to be safe for their entry); Carter, 896 S.W.2d at 928 (noting that a property "possess-
or's intention in offering the invitation determines the status of the [entrant] and
establishes the duty of care the possessor owes the visitor").
121. See Morin, 612 A.2d at 1199 (noting that possessors have a duty to inspect
and maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition for invitees); Riddle v. McLouth
Steel Products Corp., 485 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Mich. 1992) (noting that premises owners
must exercise care to protect invitees from conditions that might result in injury).
122. See Morin, 612 A.2d at 1199 (noting that a possessor must use reasonable
care to refrain from subjecting a licensee to danger and to warn a licensee of
dangerous conditions known to the possessor but possibly not observable to a
licensee).
123. For an example of the statutory wording, see supra note 100.
124. The absence of knowledge or implied knowledge by the plaintiff is also
critical under the Arkansas and Michigan statutes. See infra notes 171-76 and
accompanying text.
125. The negligence would involve a breach of reasonable care to make the condi-
tion safe or to warn the injured party of the condition.
126. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 128 § 2E (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14
(1997).
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defendant who is simply negligent or grossly negligent may
qualify for immunity and avoid liability for injuries or proper-
ty damage. 2 7 Liability under this type of statutory scheme
may be similar to the duty of care owed by landowners to
licensees to refrain from wantonly or willfully causing
injury. 128
State courts have relied upon interpretations of other stat-
utes to ascertain the meaning of willful, wanton, and reckless
misconduct. Willful conduct is "action intended to do harm;"'
29
if a person intentionally persists in conduct that involves a
high probability of substantial harm to another, the conduct
is wanton or reckless. 3 ° Willful and wanton conduct generally
involves "actual intention or ... a conscious disregard or
indifference for the consequences" regarding the safety of other
persons.13' Bare allegations of willfulness, or allegations of
simple negligence, will not suffice to preclude summary judg-
ment against a plaintiff who is required to establish willful
misconduct. 132 As the Georgia Supreme Court stated, "Wanton
127. Because courts suggest that willful, wanton, and reckless conduct goes
beyond gross negligence, an allegation of gross negligence would be insufficient to
raise a cause of action under a pick-your-own statute. See Lane v. Meserve, 482
N.E.2d 530, 532 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (noting that willful and reckless conduct is
different in kind from negligence); Armstrong's Case, 472 N.E.2d 669, 672 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1984) (suggesting that the evidence required for gross negligence is less than
the evidence required to show wanton and reckless conduct); see also Golding v.
Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 901 (Utah 1990) (suggesting that gross
negligence, defined as reckless indifference, is insufficient to show willful or malicious
conduct); Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335
(Utah 1985) (stating that willful misconduct goes beyond gross negligence).
128. See, e.g., Fuehrerv. Board of Educ., 574 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ohio 1991) (finding
a person injured on school property to be a licensee when the person entered the
property for his own benefit); Provencher v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 551 N.E.2d 1257,
1260 (Ohio 1990) (finding that a person injured at a state roadside rest area was a
licensee).
129. Gage v. City of Westfield, 532 N.E.2d 62, 68 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); see also
Seeholzer v. Kellstone, Inc., 610 N.E.2d 594, 597 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("Willful
conduct involves an intent, purpose or design to injure.") (quoting Denzer v. Terpstra,
193 N.E. 647 (Ohio 1934)). The Seeholzer court found that by failing to exercise any
care at all to warn known trespassers of the danger of an unmarked cable, the
defendant may have acted wantonly. See id. at 599.
130. See Gage, 532 N.E.2d at 68. Wanton conduct may involve "a failure to exer-
cise any care whatsoever toward those to whom a duty is owed under circumstances
in which there is a great probability that harm will result." Easterling v. American
Olean Tile Co., 600 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (finding that violation of
a statute did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct).
131. Synder v. Olmstead, 634 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (considering
conduct that contributed to a tractor accident).
132. See Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 646 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(finding that unsupported allegations of recklessness or carelessness failed to
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conduct consists of that conduct which is so reckless or so
charged with indifference to the consequences [as to be the]
equivalent in spirit to actual intent."'33 Reckless conduct is
defined through state case law, and may vary from state to
state. 134 The reckless disregard of safety is generally consid-
ered somewhat less egregious than malicious conduct.'35
These pick-your-own statutes, with their egregious mis-
conduct standard, 36 seem to offer greater protection for
defendants than the unreasonable risk standard.'37 As dis-
cussed previously, the unreasonable risk standard allows pick-
your-own operators to incur liability for inappropriate conduct
with respect to a condition involving an unreasonable risk. 38
Conversely, given the high threshold of willful, wanton, or
reckless conduct, a pick-your-own statute incorporating an
egregious misconduct standard would likely shield a pick-your-
own operator from liability for some inappropriate conduct
that involves an unreasonable risk, as long as the conduct is
not willful, wanton or reckless.'39
establish willfulness within the exception of the state's recreational use statute);
Bragg v. Genesee County Agric. Soc'y, 644 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (N.Y. 1994) (noting that
the record failed to present evidence of malice or willful intent that would preclude
defendants from qualifying for the immunity provided by the state's recreational use
statute).
133. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1994) (quoting Hendon v.
DeKalb County, 417 S.E.2d 705, 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)) (finding the evidence
insufficient to establish conduct that manifested a willful or wanton disregard for life
or property).
134. Compare Forbush v. City of Lynn, 625 N.E.2d 1370, 1372 n.6. (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) (noting that the terms willful, wanton, and reckless are often used inter-
changeably) with Gage v. City of Westfield, 532 N.E.2d 62, 68-69 (Mass. App. Ct.
1988) (distinguishing willful conduct from wanton and reckless conduct).
135. See, e.g., Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 464 N.W.2d 654, 663 (Wis. 1991) (analyz-
ing Wisconsin's recreational use statute and noting that reckless disregard of safety
does not necessarily show maliciousness).
136. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128 § 2E (West Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508:14 (1983 & Supp. 1995).
137. See supra notes 126-35 and accompanying text (describing egregious mis-
conduct provisions).
138. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing failure to use
reasonable care).
139. This assumes that willful or wanton conduct involves more than exposing
potential plaintiffs to an unreasonable risk.
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III. CASES AGAINST PICK-YOUR-OWN OPERATIONS
Although there are few reported cases against pick-your-own
operators, this does not necessarily mean that there are few
accidents at pick-your-own operations; the lack of reported
litigation may be due to the nature of the injuries. Typical
accidents at pick-your-own operations, such as falling from a
stepladder 4 ° or stepping in a hole,'41 may involve only minor
injuries and may not be litigated, especially at the appellate
level. Moreover, these cases may not reach an appellate court
due to the use of insurance to pay the claims, settlement
outside of court, or satisfactory resolution by a trial court.
142
Furthermore, the limited assets of some pick-your-own opera-
tions may discourage appellate litigation.'43
Nevertheless, the existing cases demonstrate some
important aspects of injuries occurring on the premises of
pick-your-own operations. The most common cause of action
against a pick-your-own operation for injuries to a person
harvesting produce would likely be based, upon a negligence
theory.'44 In some cases, however, a plaintiff may be able to
show that the injuries arose from a defective product provided
under a bailment so that a defendant would be strictly
liable.'45 Finally, although a number of courts have held that
140. See, e.g., Ciaglo v. Ciaglo, 156 N.E.2d 376, 378 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959) (involving
a fall from a ladder); Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 753, 754
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (involving a fall from a three-legged ladder); Christmann v.
Murphy, 642 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 1996) (involving a fall from a stepladder);
Klump v. Bowman, 498 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (App. Div. 1986) (involving a fall from an
old, spliced ladder).
141. See, e.g., Lawless v. Sasnett, 408 S.E.2d 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (involving
injuries to a ankle from stepping in a hole); Walsh v. Richey-Gilbert Co., 346 P.2d
1010 (Wash. 1959) (involving injuries sustained by stepping into a hole when
dismounting from a ladder).
142. Presumably, most pick-your-own operators would have property insurance
that would cover common accidents.
143. Marginal pick-your-own operators would perhaps be forced out of business
by protracted litigation. Furthermore, some persons injured at pick-your-own
operations in small towns and rural areas may forgo litigation given the social
contacts among persons in such areas and the self-sufficiency of many of the
residents.
144. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 753, 757-58
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that an orchard owner was a bailor or lessor of a
defective ladder). See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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allegations of negligence with respect to obvious dangers and
known conditions are insufficient to establish a cause of
action, 4 6 a dangerous condition known to a pick-your-own
operator but not to an invitee harvesting produce is often
sufficient to establish a negligence cause of action. 147
A. Obvious Dangers and Known Conditions
Three cases involving pick-your-own accidents demonstrate
that the plaintiffs awareness of the particular condition that
led to the accident causing the injuries is especially important.
If there was an obvious danger, or if the plaintiff should have
been aware of the condition, the pick-your-own operator may
not be liable for the injuries.
In Christmann v. Murphy,148 an action involving injuries
sustained due to a fall from a stepladder, 149 the court exam-
ined the duties that the landowner owed to the plaintiff. The
court concluded that there was no duty to warn of dangers
associated with the normal use of the stepladder 5 ° because
these dangers were obvious.' 5 ' Because the plaintiff had not
alleged any defects concerning the ladder 52 or that the defen-
dant's conduct in providing the stepladder caused the accident,
the plaintiff had not shown any negligence that would estab-
lish a viable cause of action. 5 '
The Illinois Appellate Court came to a similar conclusion in
Ciaglo v. Ciaglo," holding that the plaintiff had not shown that
any negligence of the defendants contributed to her injuries.'
146. See infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text (describing cases involving
obvious dangers and known conditions).
147. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (describing dangerous condi-
tions known to the defendant and not the plaintiff).
148. 642 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 1996).
149. See id. at 124.
150. The court found that the "defendant had no duty 'to protect plaintiff from the
unfortunate consequences of [her] own actions.'" Id. at 124-25 (quoting Macey v.
Truman, 519 N.E.2d 304, 305 (N.Y. 1987)).
151. See Christmann, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
152. It was "undisputed that the stepladder was not defective. "Id. at 124.
153. See id.
154. 156 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959).
155. See id. at 380. The plaintiff was injured when a cow frightened her and she
fell off a ladder, but the plaintiff did not present any evidence that the cow had a
'mischievous propensity to commit injury." Id. The court found that the plaintiff was
a licensee because she was a social guest visiting her son, the lessor of the farm on
which the accident occurred. See id. at 379-80.
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The final case, Walsh v. Richey-Gilbert Co.,"' involved a
condition of which the plaintiff should have been aware due to
plaintiffs experience working in orchards.'57 Under the doc-
trine of assumption of risk, the plaintiffs awareness precluded
him from maintaining a suit for injuries from the known
danger.15'
B. Dangerous Conditions Involving an
Unreasonable Risk of Harm
Unlike obvious or known conditions that cause injuries, a
dangerous condition involving an unreasonable risk of harm
known to a pick-your-own operator may lead to liability.
Persons gathering produce at a pick-your-own operation have
the status of invitees, and state law treats them accordingly. 159
If a dangerous condition involving an unreasonable risk,
combined with a lack of ordinary care to keep the premises
safe, precipitates an accident, the injured plaintiff may have
a cause of action for negligence.160
Moreover, defendant property owners may incur liability for
not keeping their premises safe if they have constructive
knowledge that a dangerous condition exists.' In Lawless v.
Sasnett,"2 the court held that the defendants' constructive
knowledge of a dangerous condition which had resulted in
injury was sufficient to establish a case. 63 While the plaintiff
was walking among the nectarine trees, she stepped into a
156. 346 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1959).
157. See id. at 1011. The plaintiff had worked in orchards in the same valley for
21 years. See id. The plaintiff was injured when he stepped in a hole covered by a
mat of cover crop and weeds. See id. at 1010. The court found that although the
matted cover crop could conceal a dangerous hole, the plaintiff was aware of the risk
of holes. See id. at 1011. Due to the plaintiff's experience in orchards, he knew that
gophers and irrigation leaks caused holes and that some would be large enough to
step in. See id.
158. See id. at 1011.
159. See, e.g., Lawless v. Sasnett, 408 S.E.2d 432, 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (finding
that the person picking fruit was an invitee).
160. See id. at 433.
161. See id. at 433 (finding that the testimony established the possibility that the
defendants should have known of the hole).
162. 408 S.E.2d 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (relating to an injury to a plaintiff
visiting the defendants' orchard).
163. See id. at 432.
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hole and suffered multiple fractures to her right ankle. 6 4 The
plaintiff claimed that she had looked down toward the ground
prior to her injury but that the grass, which was about one
foot in height, prevented her from seeing the hole.'65 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that they
had no knowledge of the hole.'66 On appeal, the court found
that constructive knowledge of the hole's existence could be
sufficient to establish a case. 6 ' Because the defendants had
failed to present evidence that they had used reasonable care
in inspecting the premises, the court of appeals reversed the
grant of summary judgment. 168
C. Bailments
Negligence may not be the only cause of action when one is
injured in a pick-your-own situation. In some situations, a
pick-your-own operator's act of supplying equipment, such as
a ladder, may create a bailment relationship. 169 In some states,
a bailor or lessor may be held strictly liable for an injury
arising from the provision of a defective product. 7 °
D. Accidents Under Pick-Your-Own
Immunity Provisions
In order to deduce the true effect of the new pick-your-own
statutes, it is necessary to ascertain how the findings of the
reported cases involving pick-your-own accidents fit with the
provisions of these new statutes. The question is this: if a
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 433.
167. See id. The plaintiffs testimony concerning the size of the hole allowed an
inference that it had existed for a substantial period of time and was large enough
that it should have been observable by the defendants. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 753, 757-58 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) (finding that an orchard owner was a bailor or lessor of a defective
ladder).
170. See id. (imposing absolute liability on a landowner who provides a defective
ladder to a person picking fruit on his or her land).
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pick-your-own statute had applied to the accidents which
occurred in these cases, how would it have affected the results
of the litigation?
Assuming the facts of the Ciaglo accident'71 in a jurisdiction
that has adopted an unreasonable risk standard, it is clear
that there is a need for a statutory definition of the plaintiff's
knowledge or constructive knowledge.'72 The injury in Ciaglo
occurred after a cow frightened the plaintiff, who was on a
ladder picking fruit.'73 The presence of a cow near a person
using a ladder is a condition that seems to involve an unrea-
sonable risk of harm. 74 It also appears that the plaintiff and
one of the defendants both knew of the condition. 175 The
Arkansas and Michigan pick-your-own statutes provide immu-
nity in situations where the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the condition involving the unreasonable risk of
harm. 76
The Pennsylvania pick-your-own statute, however, contains
no comparable provision concerning a plaintiffs knowledge of
the unreasonably dangerous condition. 17 A plaintiff may
defeat the immunity provided by the Pennsylvania statute if
the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in making a
known condition safe. 178 Because the Ciaglo defendants could
have excluded their cattle from the area where the plaintiff
was picking fruit, their failure to exercise reasonable care in
making the premises safe would likely give rise to liability.
179
171. Ciaglo v. Ciaglo, 156 N.E.2d 376, 378 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959). See supra notes
154-55 and accompanying text.
172. Both the Arkansas and Michigan unreasonable risk statutes define these
terms, but the Pennsylvania statute does not. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107(b)
(Michie Supp. 1995) and MICH. COMP. STAT. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp.
1996) with 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339 (West Supp. 1997).
173. See Ciaglo, 156 N.E.2d at 378.
174. Under the Michigan statute the condition need not be dangerous; it simply
must involve an unreasonable risk of harm. See supra note 100.
175. From the facts of the case, one can infer that the plaintiff knew cattle were
in the area of the tree; the opinion states that the plaintiff fed the yearlings in an
enclosure that apparently contained the tree where plaintiff was injured. See Ciaglo,
156 N.E.2d at 378.
176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1996).
177. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a) (West Supp. 1997).
178. This includes constructive knowledge by the plaintiff. See supra notes 159-68
and accompanying text. For the wording of a statute that defines 'constructive
knowledge, see supra note 100.
179. Liability stems from the violation of the statutory duty to exercise reasonable
care. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
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By prescribing a duty of care, the Pennsylvania pick-your-own
statute seems to increase the liability of pick-your-own opera-
tions;180 the statute may create liability in situations where
none would have existed under common law.
The same result should follow, albeit for different reasons,
if the Ciaglo accident occurred in a jurisdiction with a pick-
your-own statute adopting an egregious misconduct
standard.18' Although the defendants had not engaged in
egregious conduct that would defeat the statutory immunity,
the Ciaglo defendant who did not own the farm.82 would not
qualify for immunity because in New Hampshire immunity is
only available to landowners.'83 Nevertheless, because the New
Hampshire statute does not impose any duty, the defendant
operator may qualify for immunity under common law
principles governing obvious or known conditions.8 4
An analysis of the Lawless case,'85 in which the plaintiff
broke her ankle when she stepped in a hole, suggests alternate
results under the two differing standards. Whereas an unrea-
sonable risk standard would not shield the defendant from
liability, an egregious misconduct standard should provide
sufficient immunity for the defendant.
Under pick-your-own statutes incorporating an unreasonable
risk standard, 186 the statutory immunity may not apply if
180. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (describing the creation of an
affirmative duty).
181. See supra notes 126-39 and accompanying text (describing the egregious
misconduct provisions).
182. One defendant was the landowner and the second was the operator of the
farm. A third defendant was the assistant manager of the farm, but he was never
served with process. Ciaglo, 156 N.E.2d at 377.
183. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997).
184. Possessors of property have no duty to warn licensees of obvious or patent
dangers. See, e.g., Dorton v. Francisco, 833 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Ark. 1992) (noting that
although an owner of property has no duty to warn licensees of obvious dangers,
there is a duty to warn of hidden dangers). A similar principle governs invitees: when
dangers are known or obvious, a possessor generally is not liable for the physical
harm they cause. See Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp., 485 N.W.2d 676, 683
(Mich. 1992) (holding that the "'no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers' rule
remains viable in Michigan.' "). However, this rule is subject to a limitation that
operates to hold a possessor of land liable. See Wieseler v. Sisters of Mercy Health
Corp., 540 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Iowa 1995) (finding that although the injury arose from
an obvious condition, the possessor should have anticipated the harm and taken steps
to prevent it).
185. Lawless v. Sasnett, 408 S.E.2d 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); see supra notes
159-68 and accompanying text.
186. These include the Arkansas, Michigan, and Pennsylvania statutes. See supra
notes 100-06.
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certain statutory prerequisites are established. A condition
involving an unreasonable risk accompanied by the
defendant's constructive knowledge of the condition, his failure
to use reasonable care to make the condition safe, and the
plaintiffs ignorance of the condition. would defeat the
statutory immunity. 1 7 The facts of the Lawless case do in fact
establish these prerequisites: the defendants had constructive
knowledge of a condition involving an unreasonable risk that
caused the injury,18 they did not exercise reasonable care to
make the condition safe or warn the plaintiff of the condition
or risk,' 89 and the plaintiff did not know of the condition.'9"
This combination of factors would preclude defendants from
claiming immunity under a pick-your-own statute that adopts
an unreasonable risk standard. 9'
A court deciding the Lawless case under a statute adopting
an egregious misconduct standard 192 would likely reach a
different result. The existence of a hole'93 in an orchard does
not seem to constitute willful, wanton, or reckless conduct,
194
and the defendants would likely avoid liability. Thus a pick-
your-own statute encompassing an egregious misconduct
standard would indeed defeat liability in a number of circum-
stances.
In summary, an analysis of the two pick-your-own standards
reveals a significant potential difference in their effect.
Statutes incorporating an unreasonable risk standard may not
187. See supra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
188. The evidence supported a reasonable inference that the defendants had not
used reasonable care in inspecting the premises for holes. Lawless, 408 S.E.2d at 433.
189. The jury could reasonably infer that defendants had failed to use reasonable
care in cutting the grass, such that the grass grew to heights that hid the hole. See
id.
190. See id. at 432. The plaintiff testified that she did not see the hole, and that
the area in question was covered with grass approximately one-foot in height. See id.
191. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1996); supra
notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 126-39 and accompanying text (describing the egregious
misconduct provisions).
193. If the defendant purposefully created a hole, a court might infer willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct that would disqualify the defendant from immunity.
Similarly, if the defendant knew that animals such as gophers or woodchucks were
creating holes in an area to be traversed by the public picking produce but did not
attempt to remedy the situation, a jury might find reckless conduct that would
disqualify the defendant from immunity.
194. A question may arise concerning recklessness. However, the defendants
testified that they had cut the grass as needed and had sprayed a weed spray to kill
the grass in areas the mower did not reach. See Lawless, 408 S.E.2d at 432. This
evidence seems to preclude a finding of recklessness.
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offer producers effective immunity, whereas statutes incor-
porating an egregious misconduct standard would better assist
defendants in avoiding liability.
IV. RATIONALE AND STRATEGIES FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The foregoing analysis of pick-your-own statutes presents
several issues that may deserve legislative attention. This
Part analyzes these statutory provisions to determine whether
special statutory assistance is needed, whether a preferable
model can be identified, and what issues states should consid-
er in drafting pick-your-own provisions.
A. Is Assistance Needed?
Although statistics suggest that agricultural activities are
dangerous, 195 many pick-your-own activities do not involve the
dangerous machinery often associated with agricultural acci-
dents. 9 ' In the absence of any meaningful data concerning
accidents and lawsuits involving pick-your-own operations,
some may argue that there is no real need for legislative
relief. Yet, a legislative body should find merit in taking action
to protect this type of activity because pick-your-own
operations result in lower prices and fresher produce for
consumers. 1
97
Moreover, support of this type of activity often encourages
the growth of small business operations near urban areas.'98
195. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
196. This is not true, however, where a chain saw is used to harvest a Christmas
tree or to cut firewood.
197. See Surendra P. Singh et al., Direct Marketing of Fresh Produce and the
Concept of Small Farmers, 2 J. INT'L FOOD & AGRIBUS. MARKETING 97, 98-99 (1991)
(noting that consumers have a renewed interest in purchasing fresh produce and
many consumers can save money by buying directly from farmers).
198. See Shida Rastegari Henneberry & Catherine Barron, Marketing and Pur-
chasing Oklahoma Fruits and Vegetables, 63 OKLA. CURRENT FARM ECON. 15, 16 (1990)
(classifying produce growers, including pick-your-own operations, as small opera-
tions); Singh, supra note 197, at 115-17 (noting a greater concentration of pick-your
own operations in urban counties).
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This comports with the positive public sentiment toward the
maintenance of open space and agricultural uses in developed
areas. 9s If legislatures are willing to extend special protection
to operators of ski, roller-skating, and equine facilities to help
them avoid liability for sports-related injuries,200 pick-your-
own operators should be entitled to enjoy similar protection.
Another reason for supporting statutory tort immunity for
pick-your-own operations is that comparative negligence, as
opposed to contributory negligence,20 ' potentially exposes
operators to far greater liability for customer injury.20 2 More-
over, having to litigate these issues may render many pick-
your-own operations unprofitable because they often have
limited financial resources.20 3 Pick-your-own statutes applying
an egregious misconduct standard would help operators avoid
litigation over customer injuries, thereby facilitating the
continued availability of pick-your-own produce and the con-
tinued viability of these small businesses.
Analysis of the Lawless case2 4 showed how a pick-your-own
statute applying an egregious misconduct standard may
change existing law.2"5 The central question is whether cus-
tomers or operators should bear the risk for accidents. Should
customers who pick their own produce be able to assume that
the ground of an orchard does not have hidden dangers, so
that they can collect damages for any injury? If so, should
injured customers be able to maintain every lawsuit simply by
199. See Owen J. Furuseth, Public Attitudes Toward Local Farmland Protection
Programs, GROWTH & CHANGE, Summer 1987, at 49, 52 (finding that 71% of survey
respondents favored protecting local agricultural resources in Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina); B. Delworth Gardner, The Economics of Agricultural Land Preser-
vation, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1027, 1028-29 (1977) (noting a societal interest in
preserving agricultural land for open space and environmental amenities).
200. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
201. Comparative negligence allows recovery despite some negligence by a plain-
tiff, whereas under contributory negligence, a negligent plaintiff is barred from
recovery. See supra note 20.
202. See, e.g., Klump v. Bowman, 498 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (App. Div. 1986) (finding
that a damage award to an injured customer of a pick-your-own operation was
inadequate in a case where the jury had apportioned liability in an amount of 60%
against that customer).
203. See, e.g., Henneberry & Barron, supra note 198, at 16 (classifying pick-your-
own operations in Oklahoma as small operations). Because of the limited financial
resources of a small operation, a lawsuit could cause the operation to go out of
business.
204. Lawless v. Sasnett, 408 S.E.2d 432, 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). See supra notes
163-68 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
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alleging that a property owner failed to use ordinary care in
inspecting the premises or in keeping them safe? °6 Or should
customers, injured possibly due to their own carelessness,
suffer the consequences of their actions unless there was
egregious conduct by the defendant property owners?
Responses to these questions depend both on jury
determinations of reasonableness and on the duties that pick-
your-own operators owe to their customers. Although one may
question whether it is possible to draw a satisfactory dis-
tinction between conditions involving an unreasonable risk or
egregious conduct and those for which pick-your-own operators
should not be liable, it appears that the new statutory
dispensation provides a preferable resolution of standards for
treatment of liability for pick-your-own accidents.0 7 With the
new pick-your-own legislation, as with the sport activity
statutes, states express dissatisfaction with the standards
which the common law has established for the customers of
certain types of business activities.0 8 In view of the protection
the sport activity statutes afford against liability for inherent
risks, the pick-your-own statutory immunity is also a
reasonable protection.
B. Finding an Appropriate Standard
The previous examination of liability statutes revealed three
possible models that legislatures might adopt in developing
pick-your-own tort immunity statutes: Good Samaritan, recre-
ational use, and sport activity protections.0 9 These models are
useful in determining the proper standard of care for operators
of pick-your-own facilities.
Existing pick-your-own statutes adopt one of two standards
of care. One, the unreasonable risk standard, imposes liability
206. The Lawless court applied this standard. See Lawless, 408 S.E.2d at 433.
207. For example, the egregious misconduct statutory standard seems to imply
that a pick-your-own operator should not incur liability for injuries caused by holes
if the holes resulted from uneven terrain due to horticultural practices or acts of
nature.
208. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (distinguishing standards for
business invitees from standards for licensees).
209. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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when an operator fails to exercise reasonable care in making
premises safe. The other, the egregious misconduct standard,
imposes liability only when a defendant acts willfully,
wantonly, or recklessly.
The unreasonable risk standard resembles the recreational
use model in that both focus on the care that possessors of real
property owe to others.210 Pick-your-own statutes that adopt an
unreasonable risk standard seem to establish an affirmative
duty to exercise reasonable care in making premises safe.21" '
These statutes allow some cases to proceed based on ordinary
and gross negligence, thereby offering less protection for
operators than recreational use statutes.212 In sum, pick-your-
own statutes incorporating an unreasonable risk standard
provide inadequate protection to pick-your-own operators.2 3
The second standard of care, the egregious misconduct
standard, imposes liability on a defendant who engaged in
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Statutes adopting this
standard provide immunity from some injuries.2 4 Existing
pick-your-own statutes that use an egregious misconduct
standard make it more difficult for plaintiffs to sustain ac-
tions against pick-your-own operators than under statutes
that employ an unreasonable risk standard. Nevertheless,
cases involving sport activity statutes suggest that an
210. Under both standards, the defendant cannot be held liable unless he has
failed to exercise reasonable care with respect to the condition or risk. See, e.g.,
Newman v. Sun Valley Crushing Co., 844 P.2d 623, 628 (Ariz. 1992) (finding that a
defendant's failure to warn or guard against a dangerous condition could rise to the
level of willful and malicious conduct necessary to justify liability under a recre-
ational use statute).
211. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
212. An analysis of the facts of the Lawless case demonstrates this. See supra
notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
213. In contrast to pick-your-own statutes that employ an unreasonable risk
standard, under recreational use statutes, persons often incur liability "for willful or
malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or
activity," CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West 1982), but are protected against actions that
arise from simple negligence. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Brown, 785 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Cal.
1990) (applying the state's recreational use statute and ordering reinstatement of a
judgment of dismissal of a negligence claim); Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 646 N.E.2d
651, 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (affirming the dismissal of a negligence action because
the state's recreational use statute requires more than negligence for an action to
proceed). Such recreational statutes may also provide immunity from gross negli-
gence. See Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 901 (Utah 1990)
(stating that gross negligence defined as reckless indifference was not sufficient to
show willful or malicious conduct).
214. For one example, see supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
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egregious misconduct standard may not go far enough in
protecting pick-your-own operators.215
A sport activity statute216 might provide a better model for
the appropriate standard of care for pick-your-own operators,
because it addresses assumption of risk and places responsi-
bilities on participants.1 7 Under sport activity provisions,
participants who engage in risky activities are unable to
recover damages from sports activity operators.1 8 States could
draft pick-your-own statutes in a similar manner, placing
greater responsibility on consumers to take care when engag-
ing in pick-your-own activities.2 9
C. Issues for Legislative Consideration
This examination of the pick-your-own statutes demon-
strates that considerable variation exists among the statutory
provisions. Because pick-your-own operations need protection
from lawsuits for some injuries, there are four issues which
deserve particular legislative consideration in providing that
protection: defendant qualifications, premises covered, actions
precluded, and conduct excused.
1. Status of the Defendant-A statutory exception for pick-
your-own operations must include all the various parties
involved in a pick-your-own operation. Statutory protection of
landowners or operators, to the exclusion of associated
215. For example, ski operators in Idaho have no duty of care with respect to
activities they undertake to lessen risks inherent in the sport of skiing. See Northcutt
v. Sun Valley Co., 787 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Idaho 1990) (analyzing IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1103,
-1104, -1106 (1990)). The defendant operator had placed a sign on the slope indicating
its relative degree of difficulty in compliance with the ski statute, IDAHO CODE § 6-
1103 (1990); the plaintiff collided with the signpost. The court held that under the
qualifying provision of the statute, the defendant did not have any duty to mark his
trails and slopes in accordance with any standard of care. See Northcutt, 787 P.2d at
1163.
216. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 53 & 56.
218. See, e.g., Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1160 (holding that the state's ski statute
immunized the defendant ski operator from liability for negligence where the plaintiff
collided first with another skier, then with a signpost).
219. Possible changes include delineating affirmative duties for persons picking
produce or expanding the description of the risks assumed by such persons. Cf N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 18-105 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995) (defining duties of skiers);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:14-6 (West 1996) (stating that roller rink patrons assume "obvious
and necessary" risks).
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personnel, does not provide very useful protection.22 ° A pick-
your-own operation may involve owners of land, operators,
occupants, lessees, and employees, all of whom should be
candidates for statutory immunity. This does not mean that
all of these classes merit the same level of immunity,22' but
each must be considered in the immunity provisions so that all
persons potentially involved in pick-your-own mishaps receive
appropriate relief.
2. Premises Covered-States must incorporate coverage of
a sufficiently broad category of premises into their statutory
provisions for pick-your-own operations if the statute is to
provide meaningful protection. The Massachusetts statute, for
example, limits liability only for injuries incurred on the
agricultural land itself, thereby potentially precluding cover-
age for accidents occurring at sales facilities.222 The New
Hampshire statute only covers an owner's land.2 3 If a legisla-
tive body goes to the trouble of delineating an exception to
common law tort liability for pick-your-own operations, it
should insure that the exception has coverage sufficient to
provide operators with meaningful protection from that
liability.
3. Actions Precluded-Depending on individual needs and
concerns, legislatures may enact provisions designed to pre-
serve the rights of employees and contractors. 224 The purpose
of the pick-your-own provisions was to address injuries to
customers harvesting produce, not to negate existing liability
provisions for employees and contractors. 225 Statutory provi-
sions should be constructed to leave intact existing liability
provisions for these persons.
Another concern may be whether any warning to customers
harvesting produce is necessary. Some of the sport activity
statutes require warning signs, 226 as does the Massachusetts
220. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
222. See MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 128 § 2E (1996); see also supra note 75 and accom-
panying text.
223. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997); see also supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
225. See statutes cited supra note 88.
226. This is true of many of the equine liability statutes. See Terence J. Centner,
Adopting Good Samaritan Immunity for Defendants'in the Horse Industry, 12 AGRIC.
AND HUM. VALUES 69, 78 (1995) (listing warning requirements for various equine
liability statutes in chart form); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-107 (1995 & Supp.
1996) (prescribing sign requirements under a ski safety statute).
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pick-your-own statute.22 7 Perhaps customers picking produce
need to know that they are assuming certain risks and that a
different liability standard exists for injuries occurring during
their harvesting activities.
A final concern involves the scope of damages covered by
pick-your-own statutes. Comparing these immunity statutes
raises the question of whether property damage should be
covered as well. 8 More information on actual accident losses
is needed to address this issue.
4. Conduct Excused-States must also attempt to achieve
consistency in the conduct they excuse. Statutes incorporating
an egregious misconduct standard potentially excuse gross
negligence.229 Conversely, statutes incorporating an unreason-
able risk standard do not always excuse liability accompanying
conditions involving an unreasonable risk.2 °' Although these
statutes are not intended to provide a defense against all inju-
ries, the statutes following the unreasonable risk standard do
not provide sufficient protection to pick-your-own operators.23 '
In view of the sport activity statutes and the protection they
offer sport facility operators,23 2 legislatures should enact the
stronger egregious misconduct standard in order to ensure
adequate protection for pick-your-own operators.
CONCLUSION
Pick-your-own statutes seek to offer enumerated parties
protection against liability for some tortious conduct. The level
of protection provided to pick-your-own operations varies with
the immunity standard the particular state applies. Thus, the
pick-your-own statutes are categorized according to two stan-
dards. The provisions of the Arkansas, Michigan, and Pennsyl-
vania pick-your-own statutes adopt an unreasonable risk
standard. This standard establishes an affirmative duty for
227. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 128 § 2E (1996).
228. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
229. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 128 § 2E (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14
(1997); see also supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
230. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.73301 (West Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8339 (West Supp. 1996).
231. This was illustrated by the analysis of the facts of the Lawless case. See
supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 215 & 218.
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possessors of property to exercise reasonable care in making
premises safe or in warning invitees of conditions involving an
unreasonable risk. The immunity these three statutes offer
may not apply to injuries caused by a condition involving an
unreasonable risk; thus pick-your-own operations are negli-
gent, and potentially liable, if they fail to exercise reasonable
care.
The New Hampshire and Massachusetts statutes incorporate
an egregious misconduct standard that provides immunity for
injuries except when a defendant's conduct was willful,
wanton, or reckless. This standard appears to protect pick-
your-own operations from liability for injuries in some situa-
tions where the operator may have been negligent or grossly
negligent. Thus, the adoption of a pick-your-own statute
incorporating an egregious misconduct standard alters state
common law to offer some added protection for pick-your-own
operations against liability for injuries of persons harvesting
produce.
Although a legislature may be hesitant to enact a pick-your-
own statute creating a new statutory exception for a particular
interest group, it should consider two questions. First, what
justification is there for creating tort immunity? The location
of pick-your-own operations, agricultural land preservation,
and availability of fresh food products offer a sufficient justifi-
cation. Second, what duties and standards of care does the
state want to impose upon citizens and activities within its
jurisdiction? If legislative provisions already provide tort
immunity for skiing, roller skating, or equine operators, there
is no reason to believe that pick-your-own operations do not
merit similar treatment. As currently drafted, the two pick-
your-own standards do not provide as much protection as the
sport activity statutes do. Rather, the current pick-your-own
provisions simply reallocate a few of the risks to persons who
engage in harvesting activities. States could better encourage
these beneficial operations by affording them the same com-
prehensive immunity that they currently reserve for sport and
recreational activities.
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